Which Design Aspiration Does The Sun Devil Service Standard Support?
SP-4208 LIVING AND WORKING IN SPACE: A HISTORY OF SKYLAB
[ 1 ] An world-orbiting station, equipped to written report the dominicus, the stars, and the world, is a concept found in the earliest speculation about infinite travel. During the determinative years of the U.s.a. space plan, space stations were amid many projects considered. Simply subsequently the national determination in 1961 to send men to the moon, infinite stations were relegated to the background.
Projection Apollo was a firm commitment for the 1960s, but beyond that the prospects for space exploration were not clear. Equally the first one-half of the decade ended, new social and political forces raised serious questions almost the nation's priorities and brought the infinite program under pressure. At the same time, those responsible for America'southward space capability saw the need to look beyond Apollo for projects that would preserve the country'due south leadership in infinite. The fourth dimension was not propitious for such a search, for the national mood that had sustained the space program was changing.
In the summer of 1965, the office that became the Skylab program role was established in NASA Headquarters, and the project that evolved into Skylab was formally chartered equally a conceptual design study. During the years 1965-1969 the grade of the spacecraft and the content of the programme were worked out. As long as the Apollo goal remained to be achieved, Skylab was a stepchild of manned spaceflight, achieving status merely with the starting time lunar landing. When it became clear that America'southward space programme could not proceed at the level of urgency and priority that Apollo had enjoyed, Skylab became the means of sustaining manned spaceflight while the next generation of hardware and missions developed.
The commencement 5 chapters of this book trace the origins of the Skylab concept from its emergence in the period 1962-1965 through its evolution into final form in 1969.
Directions for Manned Spaceflight . Infinite Stations after 1962 . Sizing Upward a Space Station . Air Forcefulness Seeks Role in Infinite . President Calls for NASA's Plans . Mueller Opens Apollo Applications Program Office .
[ 2 ] The summer of 1965 was an eventful one for the thousands of people involved in the American infinite plan. In its seventh twelvemonth, the National Aeronautics and Infinite Administration (NASA) was hard at work on the Gemini program, its second serial of world-orbiting manned missions. Mercury had concluded on 16 May 1963. For 22 months subsequently that, while the two-man Gemini spacecraft was brought to flight readiness, no American went into space. Two unmanned test flights preceded the first manned Gemini mission, launched on 23 March 1965. 1
Mercury had been used to learn the fundamentals of manned spaceflight. Even before the first Mercury astronaut orbited the world, President John F. Kennedy had set NASA its major task: to send a human to the moon and bring him back safely past 1970. Much had to be learned before that could exist done-not to mention the rockets, ground support facilities, and launch complexes that had to be built and tested-and Gemini was part of the grooming program. Rendezvous-bringing two spacecraft together in orbit-was a part of that program; another was a determination of man'southward ability to survive and part in the weightlessness of spaceflight.
That summer the American public was getting acquainted, past way of network tv, with the site where most of the Gemini activeness was taking identify-the Manned Spacecraft Heart (MSC). Located on the apartment Texas coastal plain 30 kilometers southeast of downtown Houston- close plenty to be claimed by that city and given to it by the media-MSC was NASA's newest field center, and Gemini was the first program managed in that location. Mercury had been planned and conducted by the Space Chore Group, located at Langley Enquiry Center, Hampton, Virginia. Creation of the new Manned Spacecraft Center, to be staffed initially by members of the Space Job Group, was announced in 1961; by the middle of 1962 its personnel had been moved to temporary quarters in Houston; and in 1964 it occupied its new domicile. The 4.1-square-kilometer center provided facilities for spacecraft design and testing, crew grooming, and [ 3 ] flying operations or mission control. By 1965 nearly 5000 civil servants and near twice that many aerospace-contractor employees were working at the Texas site. ii
Heading this 2nd largest of NASA's manned spaceflight centers was the man who had formed its predecessor group in 1958, Robert R. Gilruth. Gilruth had joined the staff at Langley in 1937 when it was a heart for aeronautics inquiry of NASA'south precursor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). He presently demonstrated his ability in Langley's Flight Inquiry Partition, working with examination pilots in quantifying the characteristics that make a satisfactory airplane. Progressing to transonic and supersonic flight research, Gilruth came naturally to the problems of guided missiles. In 1945 he was put in charge of the Pilotless Shipping Research Segmentation at Wallops Island, Virginia, where ane problem to exist solved was that of bringing a missile dorsum through the atmosphere intact. When the conclusion was made in 1958 to requite the new national space agency the chore of putting a man into globe orbit, Gilruth and several of his Wallops Island colleagues moved to the Space Task Group, a new organization charged with designing the spacecraft to practice that job. 3
The Infinite Task Group had, in fact, already claimed that task for itself, and information technology went at the problem in typical NACA fashion. NACA had been a pattern, research, and testing organization, accustomed to working with shipping builders but doing no fabrication work itself. The same mode characterized MSC. The Mercury and Gemini spacecraft owed their basic pattern to Gilruth's engineers, who supervised structure past the McDonnell Aircraft Company of St. Louis and helped test the finished hardware. 4
In the summertime of 1965 the Manned Spacecraft Center was up to its ears in work. By the middle of June two manned Gemini missions had been flown and a third was in preparation. Xxx-three astronauts, including the first six selected as scientist-astronauts, i were in various stages of training and preparation for flight. Reflecting the general bullishness of the manned space program, NASA appear plans in September to recruit still more flying crews. 5
Houston'south design engineers, meanwhile, were difficult at work on the spacecraft for the Apollo program. The important choice of mission way-rendezvous in lunar orbit-had been made in 1962; it dictated two vehicles, whose construction MSC was supervising. North American Aviation, Inc., of Downey, California, was building the command ship consisting of a control module and a supporting service module- collectively chosen the command and service module-which carried the crew to lunar orbit and back to world. A continent away in Bethpage [ 4 ] Long Isle, Grumman Shipping Technology Corporation was working on the lunar module, a spidery-looking spacecraft that would set two men down on the moon's surface and return them to the command module, waiting in lunar orbit, for the trip home to earth. Houston engineers had established the basic design of both spacecraft and were working closely with the contractors in building and testing them. All of the important subsystems-guidance and navigation, propulsion and attitude control, life-support and environmental control-were MSC responsibilities; and beginning with Gemini 4, control of all missions passed to Houston once the booster had cleared the launch pad. 6
Since the drama of spaceflight was inherent in the risks taken past the men in the spacecraft, public attention was near oftentimes directed at the Houston functioning. This superficial and news-conscious view, though true enough during flight and recovery, paid scant attention to the launch vehicles and to the complex operations at the launch site, without which the comparatively small spacecraft could never accept gone anywhere, let alone to the moon.
The Saturn launch vehicles were the responsibility of NASA's largest field center, the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, 10 kilometers southwest of Huntsville in northern Alabama. Marshall had been built effectually the nigh famous cadre in rocketry-Wernher von Braun and his associates from Peenemunde, Germany's eye for rocket enquiry during World State of war II. Driven since his schoolboy days past the dream of spaceflight, von Braun in 1965 was well on the way to seeing that dream realized, for the NASA center of which he was director was supervising the development of the Saturn V, the monster three-stage rocket that would ability the moon mission. seven
Marshall Space Flying Middle was shaped past experiences quite unlike those that molded the Manned Spacecraft Center. The rocket enquiry and development that von Braun and his colleagues began in Germany in the 1930s had been supported past the German army, and their postwar work continued under the supervision of the U.S. army. In 1950 the group moved to Redstone Arsenal outside Huntsville, where information technology functioned much as an army arsenal does, not only designing launch vehicles but edifice them also. From von Braun all the way downward, Huntsville's rocket builders were dirty-easily engineers, and they had produced many Redstone and Jupiter missiles. In 1962 von Braun remarked in an commodity written for a management magazine, "nosotros can still conduct an idea for a space vehicle . . . from the concept through the entire development cycle of pattern, development, fabrication, and testing." That was the fashion he felt his organization should operate, and so it did; of 10 first stages congenital for the Saturn I, eight were turned out at Marshall. 8
The sheer size of the Apollo task required a division of responsibility, and the MSC and Marshall shares were sometimes characterized as [ 5 ] "above and below the musical instrument unit." ii To be sure, the booster and its payload were not completely independent, and the two centers cooperated whenever necessary. Just on the whole, as Robert Gilruth said of their roles, "They built a damned good rocket and we built a damned good spacecraft." Von Braun, notwithstanding, whose thinking had never been restricted to launch vehicles lone, aspired to a larger office for Marshall: manned operations, structure of stations in globe orbit, and all phases of a complete infinite plan-which would eventually encroach on Houston'due south responsibilities. 9
But every bit long equally Marshall was occupied with Saturn, that aspiration was far from realization. Saturn development was proceeding well in 1965. The concluding test flights of the Saturn I were run off that year and preparations were under way for a series of Saturn IB shots. iii In Baronial each of the three stages of the Saturn V was successfully static-fired at full thrust and duration. Non only that, merely the third stage was fired, shut down, and restarted, successfully simulating its part of injecting the Apollo spacecraft into its lunar trajectory. Flight testing remained to exist done, simply Saturn 5 had taken a long stride. 10
Confident though they were of ultimate success, Marshall'due south 7300 employees could have felt apprehensive well-nigh their future that summer. Later Saturn V there was nothing on the drawing boards. Apollo still had a long mode to go, but most of the remaining work would take identify in Houston. Von Braun could hardly be optimistic when he summarized Marshall's prospects in a mid-Baronial memo. Noting the trend of spaceflight programs, peculiarly booster development, and reminding his coworkers that 200 positions were to exist transferred from Huntsville to Houston, von Braun remarked that it was time "to turn our attending to the future part of Marshall in the nation's infinite program." As a headquarters official would later characterize information technology, Marshall in 1965 was "a tremendous solution looking for a problem." Sooner than the other centers, Marshall was seriously wondering, "What do we practice after Apollo ?" 11
Some 960 kilometers southeast of Huntsville, halfway downwards the Atlantic coast of Florida, the 3rd of the manned spaceflight centers had no time for worry about the future. The John F. Kennedy Space Center, unremarkably referred to as "the Greatcoat" from its location adjacent to Greatcoat Canaveral' was in rapid expansion. What had started as the Launch Operations Directorate of Marshall Space Flight Center was, by 1965, a busy eye with a total work force (including contractor employees) of 20 000 people. In April structure teams topped off the huge Vehicle [ six ] Assembly Building, where the 110-meter Saturn V could be assembled indoors. Two months afterwards road tests began for the mammoth crawler-transporter that would move the rocket, consummate and upright, to 1 of two launch pads. Twelve kilometers due east on the Greatcoat, NASA launch teams were winding up Saturn I flights and working Gemini missions with the Air Force. 12
Under the directorship of Kurt Debus, who had come from Frg with von Braun in 1945, KSC's responsibilities included much more than launching rockets. At KSC all of the booster stages and spacecraft first came together, and though they were thoroughly checked and tested by their manufacturers, engineers at the Cape had to make sure they worked when put together. One of KSC's largest tasks was the complete checkout of every organisation in the completed vehicle, verifying that NASA's elaborate organization of "interface control" actually worked. If two vehicle components, manufactured by different contractors in different states, did non role together as intended, information technology was KSC's job to notice out why and run into that they were stock-still. Checkout responsibleness brought KSC into close contact not simply with the ii other NASA centers but with all of the major contractors. xiii
Responsibleness for orchestrating the operations of the field centers and their contractors lay with the Part of Manned Space Flight (OMSF) at NASA Headquarters in Washington. One of iii program offices, OMSF reported to NASA's 3rd-ranking official, Associate Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr. Ever since the Apollo commitment in 1961, OMSF had overshadowed the other program offices (the Office of Space Scientific discipline and Applications and the Office of Advanced Research and Engineering) not only in its share of public attention simply in its share of the agency'southward budget.
Directing OMSF in 1965 was George East. Mueller (pronounced "Miller"), an electric engineer with a doctorate in physics and 23 years' experience in bookish and industrial research. Earlier taking the reins as acquaintance administrator for manned spaceflight in 1963, Mueller had been vice president of Space Applied science Laboratories, Inc., in Los Angeles, where he was deeply involved in the Air Force's Minuteman missile program. He had spent his starting time yr in Washington reorganizing OMSF and gradually acclimatizing the field centers to his style of doing business organisation. Considering centralized control to exist the prime number requisite for achieving the Apollo goal, Mueller established an administrative system that gave Headquarters the principal responsibleness for policy-making while delegating equally much authority every bit possible to the centers. 14
[ 7 ] Mueller had to pick his path carefully, for the centers had what might be chosen a "States'-rights attitude" toward direction from Headquarters and had enjoyed considerable autonomy. Early on in his tenure, convinced that Apollo was non going to make it past the end of the decade, Mueller went against center judgment to plant "all-up" testing for the Saturn Five. This chosen for complete vehicles to exist test-flown with all stages performance the kickoff fourth dimension-a radical difference from the stage-by-stage testing NASA and NACA had previously done, but a procedure that had worked for Minuteman. It would save time and money-if information technology worked- merely would put a substantial brunt on reliability and quality control. Getting the centers to accept all-up testing was no small feat; when information technology succeeded, Mueller'southward stock went upward. Also putting Apollo back on schedule, this practice increased the possibility that some of the vehicles ordered for Apollo might get surplus and thus available for other uses. 15
In an of import sense the determination to shoot for the moon shortcircuited conventional schemes of space exploration. From the earliest days of serious speculation on exploration of the universe, the Europeans who had done almost of it causeless that the showtime pace would be a permanent station orbiting the earth. Pioneers such as Konstantin Eduardovich Tsiolkowskiy and Hermann Oberth conceived such a station to be useful, not only for its vantage point over the earth beneath, but every bit a staging area for expeditions outward. Wernher von Braun, raised in the European school, championed the globe-orbiting space station in the early 1950s in a widely circulated national mag article. 16
There were sound technical reasons for setting upwardly an orbiting waystation en route to distant space destinations. Rocket technology was a limiting factor; building a station in orbit by launching its components on many small rockets seemed easier than developing the huge ones required to leave the world in ane jump. Also, a permanent station would provide a place to report many of the unknowns in manned flight, man's adaptability to weightlessness existence an important one. In that location was, also, a wealth of scientific investigation that could exist done in orbit. The space station was, to many, the best way to go into space exploration; all else followed from that. 17
The sense of urgency pervading the United States in the year following Sputnik was reflected in the common metaphor, "the space race." Information technology was a race Congress wanted very much to win, even if the location of the finish line was uncertain. In late 1958 the House Select Committee on Space began interviewing leading scientists, engineers, corporate executives, and government officials, seeking to establish goals beyond Mercury. The committee's report, The Side by side Ten Years in Space, ended that a space station was the next logical step. Wernher von Braun and his staff at the Army Ballistic Missile Bureau presented a similar view in briefings for NASA. Both a infinite station and a manned lunar landing [ viii ] were included in a list of goals given to Congress past NASA Deputy Ambassador Hugh Dryden in February 1959. eighteen
Later that twelvemonth NASA created a Research Steering Committee on Manned Infinite Flight to study possibilities for post-Mercury programs. That committee is usually identified as the progenitor of Apollo; but at its first meeting members placed a space station ahead of the lunar landing in a list of logical steps for a long-term space plan. Subsequent meetings debated the research value of a station versus a moon landing, advocated as a truthful "cease objective" requiring no justification in terms of some larger goal to which it contributed. Both the space station and the lunar mission had strong advocates, and Administrator T. Keith Glennan declined to commit NASA either way. Early in 1960, yet, he did concord that after Mercury the moon should be the end objective of manned spaceflight. 19
Withal, there remained strong justification for the manned orbital station and plenty of dubiety that rocket development could make the lunar voyage possible at whatsoever early appointment. Robert Gilruth told a symposium on manned space stations in the bound of 1960 that NASA's flying missions were a compromise betwixt what infinite officials would like to do and what they could do. Looking at all the factors involved, Gilruth said, "It appears that the multi-man earth satellites are achievable . . ., while such programs equally manned lunar landing and return should non exist directly pursued at this fourth dimension. " Heinz H. Koelle, master of the Future Projects Office at Marshall Space Flight Center, offered the opinion that a minor laboratory was the adjacent logical step in world-orbital operations, with a larger (upward to 18 metric tons) and more complex one coming forth when rocket payloads could exist increased. 20 This was the Marshall viewpoint, oft expressed upward until 1962.
During 1960, however, manned flying to the moon gained clout. In the fiscal 1961 budget hearings, very little was said about space stations; the budget proposal, dissimilar the previous year's, sought no funds for preliminary studies. The bureau'south long-range program of January 1961 dropped the goal of a permanent station by 1969; rather, the Space Task Group was considering a much smaller laboratory-i that could fit into the adapter section that supported the proposed Apollo spacecraft on its launch vehicle. 21
Then, in May 1961, President John F. Kennedy all only sealed the infinite station's fate with his announcement of the moon landing as America's goal in space. It was the kind of challenge American technology could well-nigh readily accept: concise, definite, and measurable. Success or failure would be self-axiomatic. It meant, withal, that all of the efforts of NASA and much of aerospace industry would have to be narrowly focused. Given a commitment for a twenty-year plan of methodical space development, von Braun'south 1952 concept might have been accepted equally the best mode [ 9 ] to get. With only 8 1/ii years it was out of the question. The Us was going to pull off its biggest deed starting time, and at that place would be little time to remember almost what might follow.
The determination to go for the moon did non in itself rule out a space station; it made a large or circuitous one improbable, simply because there would exist neither time nor money for information technology. At Marshall, von Braun'due south grouping argued during the next year for reaching the moon by earth-orbit rendezvous-the mission manner whereby a moon-jump vehicle would be fueled from "tankers" put into orbit near the earth. Compared to the other two modes existence considered-direct flying and lunar-orbit rendezvous iv -this seemed both safer and more applied, and Marshall was solidly committed to it. In studies washed in 1962 and 1963, Marshall proposed a permanent station capable of checking out and launching lunar vehicles. In June 1962, however, NASA chose lunar-orbit rendezvous for Apollo, closing off prospects for extensive earth-orbital operations every bit a prerequisite for the lunar landing. 22
From mid-1962, therefore, space stations were proper subjects for advanced studies-exercises to identify the needs of the space program and pinpoint areas where inquiry and development were required. Much of this future-studies work went to aerospace contractors, since NASA was heavily engaged with Apollo. The door of the infinite historic period had just opened, and information technology was an era when, as one time to come projects official put it, "the sky was not the limit" to imaginative thinking. Congress was generous, also; between 1962 and 1965 it appropriated $70 one thousand thousand for future studies. A dozen firms received over 140 contracts to study earth-orbital, lunar, and planetary missions and the spacecraft to acquit them out. There were good reasons for this intensive planning. As a NASA official told a congressional committee, millions of dollars in evolution costs could be saved by determining what not to try. 23
Langley Enquiry Centre took the lead in space-station studies in the early 1960s. Later on developing a concept for a modest station in the summer of 1959-one that foreshadowed most of Skylab'south purposes and even considered the utilize of a spent rocket stage-Langley's planners went on to [ 10 ] consider much bigger stations. Artificial gravity, to exist produced by rotating the station, was one of their principal interests from the start. Having established an optimum rate and radius of rotation (4 revolutions per infinitesimal and 25 meters), they studied a number of configurations, settling finally on a hexagonal wheel with spokes radiating from a central control module. Enclosing nearly 1400 cubic meters of work space and accommodating 24 to 36 crewmen, the station would counterbalance 77 metric tons at launch. 24
Getting something of this size into orbit was another trouble. Designers anticipated severe problems if the station were launched piecemeal and assembled in orbit-a scheme von Braun had advocated 10 years earlier-and began to consider inflatable structures. Although tests were run on an 8-meter prototype, the concept was finally rejected, partly on the grounds that such a construction would be besides vulnerable to meteoroids. As an alternative Langley suggested a collapsible structure that could be erected, more than or less umbrella-fashion, in orbit and awarded North American Aviation a contract to written report it. 25
Langley'due south first efforts were summarized in a symposium in July 1962. Papers dealt with about all of the problems of a large rotating station, including life back up, ecology control, and waste management. Langley engineers felt they had made considerable progress toward defining these problems; they were somewhat concerned, notwithstanding, that their proposals might exist too large for NASA's immediate needs. 26
Like studies were under style in Houston, where early in 1962 MSC began planning a large rotating station to be launched on the Saturn 5. Equally with Langley'southward proposed stations, Houston'due south objectives were to assess the problems of living in space and to conduct scientific and technological research. Resupply modules and relief crews would exist sent to the station with the smaller Saturn IB and an Apollo spacecraft modified to behave half-dozen men, twice its normal complement. MSC'due south report proposed to put the station in orbit within four years. 27
By the fall of 1962 the immediate demands of Apollo had eased somewhat, allowing Headquarters to give more attending to futurity programs. In late September Headquarters officials urged the centers to become ahead with their technical studies fifty-fifty though no one could foresee when a station might fly. Furthermore, it had begun to look equally though rising costs in Apollo would reduce the money bachelor for time to come programs. Responses from both MSC and Langley recognized the demand for simplicity and financial restraint; just the centers differed as to the station'due south mission. Langley emphasized a laboratory for advanced applied science. Accordingly, NASA'southward offices of space science and advanced technology should play of import roles in planning. MSC considered the station'south major purpose to be a base for manned flights to Mars. 28
[ 11 ] The following calendar month Joseph Shea, deputy managing director for systems in the Office of Manned Space Flying, sought assistance in formulating future objectives for manned spaceflight. In a letter to the field centers and Headquarters plan offices, Shea listed several options being considered by OMSF, including an orbiting laboratory. Such a station was idea to be viable, he said, simply it required acceptable justification to gain approving. He asked for recommendations concerning purposes, configurations' and specific scientific and engineering requirements for the space station, with 2 points defining the context: the importance of a space station plan to science, technology, or national goals; and the unique characteristics of such a station and why such a program could not be accomplished past using Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, or unmanned spacecraft. 29 Public statements and internal correspondence during the next half dozen months stressed the agency'southward intention to design a space station that would serve national needs. 30
Past mid-1963, NASA had a definite rationale for an world-orbiting laboratory. The primary mission on early on flights would be to determine whether man could alive and work effectively in space for long periods. The weightlessness of infinite was a peculiar condition that could not be fake on world-at to the lowest degree not for more 30 seconds in an airplane. No one could predict either the long-term effects of weightlessness or the results of a sudden return to normal gravity. These biomedical concerns, though interesting in themselves, were part of a larger goal: to use space stations as bases for interplanetary flight. A offset-generation laboratory would provide facilities to develop and authorize the various systems, structures, and operational techniques needed for an orbital launch facility or a larger space station. Finally, a manned laboratory had obvious uses in the carry of scientific research in astronomy, physics, and biology.
Although mission objectives and space-station configuration were related, the experiments did not necessarily dictate a specific pattern.
NASA could exam man's reaction to weightlessness in a series of gradually extended flights commencement with Gemini hardware, a depression-cost arroyo particularly attractive to Washington. An alternate program would measure astronauts' reaction to varying levels of artificial gravity within a large rotating station. Joseph Shea pondered the choices at a conference in August 1963:
Is a minimal Apollo-type MOL [Manned Orbiting Laboratory] sufficient for the performance of a significant biomedical experiment? Or perhaps the benefits of a truly multi-purpose MOL are so overwhelming . . that i should not spend unnecessary fourth dimension and [ 12 ] endeavour . . . building modest stations, but, rather, proceed immediately with the development of a large laboratory in space. 31
Any choice NASA made, information technology could select from a broad range of spacestation concepts generated since 1958 by the inquiry centers and aerospace contractors. The possibilities fit into three categories: small, medium, and large.
The minimum vehicle, emphasizing the use of developed hardware, offered the shortest development time and everyman cost. Virtually often mentioned in this category was Apollo, the spacecraft NASA was developing for the lunar landings. At that place were 3 bones parts to Apollo: control, service, and lunar modules. The conical command module carried the coiffure from launch to lunar orbit and back to reentry and recovery, supported past systems and supplies in the cylindrical service module to which information technology was attached until just before reentry. Designed to support iii men, the CM was roomy by Gemini standards, fifty-fifty though its interior was no larger than a small lift. Stowage space was at a premium, and not much of its instrumentation could be removed for operations in earth orbit. One function of the service module was left empty to suit experiments, but it was unpressurized and could but be reached by extravehicular activity. The lunar module was an even more than specialized and less spacious craft. It was in two parts: a pressurized ascent stage containing the life-support and control systems, and a descent stage, considerably larger simply unpressurized. The descent phase could be fitted with a fair amount of experiments; but like the service module, information technology was accessible only past extravehicular activeness. 32
The shortage of attainable space was an obvious difficulty in using Apollo hardware for a space station. Proposals had been fabricated to add a pressurized module that would fit into the adapter area, between the launch vehicle and the spacecraft, but this tended to offset the advantages of using existing hardware. Notwithstanding, in July 1963, with the idea of an Apollo laboratory gaining favor, Headquarters asked Houston to supervise a N American Aviation study of an Extended Apollo mission. 33
Northward American, MSC's prime number Apollo contractor, had briefly considered the Space Task Group'south proposal for an Apollo laboratory two years before. At present company officials revived the idea of the module in the adapter area, which had grown considerably during the evolution of the Saturn blueprint. Though the study'south principal objective was to identify the modifications required to support a 120-24-hour interval flight, Due north American also examined the possibility of a one-yr mission sustained by periodic resupply of expendables. Iii possible configurations were studied: an Apollo command module with enlarged subsystems; Apollo with an attached module supported by the command module; and Apollo plus a new, selfsupporting laboratory module. A crew of 2 was postulated for the first concept; the others allowed a third astronaut. 34
[ 13 ] Changing the spacecraft's mission would entail extensive modifications only no basic structural changes. Solar cells would supplant the standard hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells, which imposed too keen a weight punishment. In view of the adverse furnishings of breathing pure oxygen for extended periods, North American recommended a nitrogen-oxygen atmosphere, and instead of the bulky lithium hydroxide canister to absorb carbon dioxide, the report proposed to use more compact and regenerable molecular sieves. 5 Cartoon from earlier studies, the study group prepared a listing of essential medical experiments and established their approximate weights and volumes, as well as the power, fourth dimension, and workspace required to deport them. Information technology turned out that the command module was too small to back up more than a bare minimum of these experiments, and fifty-fifty with the boosted module and a 3rd crewman there would not exist plenty time to perform all of the desired tests. 35
North American's report concluded that all three concepts were technically sound and could perform the required mission. The command module alone was the to the lowest degree plush, but reliance on a two-man crew created operational liabilities. Adding a laboratory module, though obviously advantageous, increased costs by 15-30% and posed a weight problem. Adding the dependent module brought the payload very well-nigh the Saturn IB's weight-lifting limit, while the contained module exceeded it. Since NASA expected to increase the Saturn'southward thrust by 1967, this was no reason to decline the concept; withal, it represented a problem that would persist until 1969: payloads that exceeded the bachelor thrust. North American recommended that any follow-up report be limited to the Apollo plus a dependent module, since this had the greatest applicability to all 3 mission proposals. The findings were welcomed at Headquarters, where the funding movie for post-Apollo programs remained unclear. The company was asked to go on its investigation in 1964, concentrating on the technical issues of extending the life of Apollo subsystems. 36
Several schemes called for a larger manned orbiting laboratory that would back up four to six men for a year with ample room for experiments Like the minimum vehicle, the medium-sized laboratory was usually a aught-gravity station that could exist adapted to provide artificial gravity Langley's Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory, a study begun in tardily 1962, was probably the all-time-known example of this type: a iv-man canister 4 meters in diameter and 7 meters long containing its own life-support systems. Although the laboratory itself would take to be [ 14 ] developed, launch vehicles and ferry craft were proven hardware. A Saturn IB or the Air Forcefulness's Titan Three could launch the laboratory, and Gemini spacecraft would carry the crews. Another advantage was simplicity: the module would be launched in its last configuration, with no requirement for assembly or deployment in orbit. Utilize of the Gemini spacecraft meant there would be no new operational problems to solve. All the same, the initial cost was unfavorable and Headquarters considered the complicated program of crew rotation a disadvantage. 37
Large station concepts, like MSC's Projection Olympus, generally required a Saturn 5 booster and separately launched crew-ferry and logistics spacecraft. Coiffure size would vary from 12 to 24, and the station would accept a five-year life span. Proposed large laboratories ranged from 46 to 61 meters in diameter, and typically contained 1400 cubic meters of space. Most provided for continuous rotation to create artificial gravity, with non-rotating central hubs for docking and zero-gravity work. Such concepts represented a space station in the traditional sense of the term, but entailed quite an increase in cost and development fourth dimension. 38
Despite the interest in Apollo as an interim laboratory, Houston was more enthusiastic about a large infinite station. In June 1963, MSC contracted for two studies, one past Douglas Shipping Company for a zerogravity station and 1 with Lockheed for a rotating station. Study specifications called for a Saturn V booster, a hangar to enclose a 12-human ferry arts and crafts, and a 24-human crew. Douglas produced a cylindrical design 31 meters long with pressurized compartments for living quarters and recreation, a command center, a laboratory that included a i-human being centrifuge to simulate gravity for brusk periods, and a hangar large enough to service iv Apollos. The concept, submitted in February 1964, was judged to be within projected future capabilities, but the work was discontinued because there was no justification for a station of that size. 39
Lockheed's concept stood a better hazard of eventual adoption, since it provided artificial gravity-favored by MSC engineers, not simply for physiological reasons but for its greater efficiency. As one of them said, "For long periods of time [such equally a trip to Mars], it might just be easier and more than comfortable for man to live in an environment where he knew where the flooring was, and where his pencil was going to exist, and that sort of matter." Lockheed's station was a Y-shaped module with a central hub providing a nada-gravity station and a hangar for ferry and logistics spacecraft. Out along the radial arms, 48 men could alive in varying levels of artificial gravity. 40
While studies of medium and large stations continued, NASA began plans in 1964 to fly Extended Apollo every bit its get-go space laboratory. George Mueller's all-upward testing decision in Nov 1963 increased the likelihood of surplus hardware by reducing the number of launches required in the moon program. Officials refused to predict how many flights might be eliminated, but 1964 plans causeless 10 or more than excess Saturns.
[ 15 ] Dollar signs, nonetheless, had become more important than surplus hardware Following ii years of generous support, Congress reduced NASA's upkeep for fiscal 1964 from $5.7 to $5.i billion. The ordinarily Optimistic von Braun told Heinz Koelle in August 1963, "I'm convinced that in view of NASA's overall funding situation, this space station matter volition not become into high gear in the next few years. Minimum C-IB approach [Saturn IB and Extended Apollo] is the merely thing we can beget at this time." The same uncertainty shaped NASA's planning the following year. In Apr 1964, Koelle told von Braun that Administrator James Webb had instructed NASA planners to provide management with "various culling objectives and missions and their associated costs and consequences rather than detailed definition of a single specific long term program." Von Braun'south wry response summed up NASA's dilemma: "Yes, that's the new line at Hq., then they can switch the tack as the Congressional winds change." 41
At the FY 1965 budget hearings in Feb 1964, testimony apropos advanced manned missions spoke of gradual development from Apollo-Saturn hardware to more advanced spacecraft. NASA had not made up its mind nigh a post-Apollo infinite station. Two months later, however, Michael Yarymovych, managing director for globe-orbital-mission studies, spelled out the agency's plans to the First Space Congress coming together at Cocoa Beach, Florida. Extended Apollo, he said, would exist an essential element of an expanding earth-orbital program, first as a laboratory and later as a logistics organisation. Some time in the hereafter, NASA would select a more than sophisticated space station from amongst the medium and large concepts under consideration. Mueller gave credence to his remarks the following calendar month past placing Yarymovych on special assignment to increase Apollo organization capabilities. 42 Meanwhile, a project had appeared that was to become Skylab'southward master competitor for the adjacent v years: an Air Strength orbiting laboratory.
For a decade after Sputnik, the U.S. Air Force and NASA vied for roles in infinite. The initial reward lay with the civilian agency, for the Space Act of 1958 declared that "activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes." In Line with this policy, the noncombatant Mercury projection was called over the Air Forcefulness'due south "Man in Space Soonest" as America's first manned space programme. 43 But the Space Act besides gave DoD responsibleness for military machine operations and evolution of weapon systems; Consequently the Air Forcefulness sponsored studies over the adjacent three years to define space bombers, manned spy-satellites, interceptors, and a command and control centre. In congressional briefings after the 1960 elections, USAF spokesmen stressed the theme that "armed forces space, defined as space out to x Earth diameters, is the battleground of the hereafter." 44
[ 16 ] For all its efforts, notwithstanding, the Air Force could not convince its civilian superiors that space was the next battlefield. When Congress added $86 one thousand thousand to the Air Forcefulness upkeep for its manned infinite glider, Dyna-Soar, Secretary of Defense Robert South. McNamara refused to spend the money. DoD's director of defense research and development testified to a congressional committee, "there is no definable need at this time, or war machine requirement at this fourth dimension" for a manned armed forces infinite program. Information technology was wise to advance American space engineering science, since military uses might appear; but "NASA can develop much of information technology or even most of it." Budget requests in 1962 reflected the Air Forcefulness's loss of position. NASA's $3.7 billion authorization was three times what the Air Forcefulness got for space activities; three years earlier the two had been almost equal. 45
Throughout the Common cold War, Russian advances proved the nearly effective stimuli for American actions; and so again in August 1962 a Soviet infinite spectacular strengthened the Air Force statement for a space role. Russia placed two spacecraft into similar orbits for the start fourth dimension. Vostok 3 and iv closed to within half-dozen 1/2 kilometers, and some American reports spoke of a rendezvous and docking. Air Force supporters saw armed services implications in the Soviet feat, prompting McNamara to reexamine Air Force plans. Critics questioned the effectiveness of NASA-USAF communication on technical and managerial problems. In response, James Webb created a new NASA mail service, deputy acquaintance ambassador for defence force affairs, and named Adm. Walter F. Boone (USN, ret.) to information technology in November 1962. In the meantime, congressional demands for a crash program had subsided, partly because successful NASA launches half dozen bolstered confidence in America's civilian programs. 46
The Cuban missile crisis occupied the Pentagon's attending through much of the autumn, simply when space roles were again considered, McNamara showed a surprising change of attitude. Early in 1962 Air Force officials had begun talking about a "Bluish Gemini" program, a plan to utilize NASA'south Gemini hardware in early training missions for rendezvous and support of a military space station. Some NASA officials welcomed the idea as a manner to enlarge the Gemini program and secure DoD funds. Merely when Webb and Seamans sought to expand the Air Strength'southward participation in December 1962, McNamara proposed that his section assume responsibility for all America'south manned spaceflight programs. NASA officials successfully rebuffed this bid for command, but did agree, at McNamara's insistence, that neither agency would start a new manned plan in near-globe orbit without the other's approval. 47 The issue remained alive for months. At one bespeak the Air Force attempted to gain command over [ 17 ] NASA'south long-range planning. An understanding was finally reached in September protecting NASA's right to carry advanced infinite-station studies but also providing for improve liaison through the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (the primary means for formal liaison between the ii agencies). The preamble to the agreement expressed the view that, equally far as practicable, the 2 agencies should combine their requirements in a mutual space-station. 48
McNamara'south efforts for a joint space-station were prompted in part by Air Force unhappiness with Gemini. Talk of a "Blue Gemini" faded in 1963 and Dyna-Soar lost much of its appeal. If NASA held to its schedules, Gemini would fly 2 years before the space glider could brand its first solo flight On 10 December Secretary McNamara terminated the Dyna-soar project, transferring a part of its funds to a new project, a Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL). 49
With MOL the Air Force hoped to establish a armed forces office for human being in infinite; but since the plan met no specific defense needs, it had to be accomplished at minimum cost. Accordingly, the Air Force planned to use proven hardware: the Titan IIIC launch vehicle, originally developed for the Dyna-Soar, and a modified Gemini spacecraft. Merely the arrangement's third major component, the laboratory, and its test equipment would exist new. The Titan could lift 5700 kilograms in add-on to the spacecraft; about two-thirds of this would go to the laboratory, the rest to examination equipment. Initial plans provided 30 cubic meters of space in the laboratory, roughly the volume of a medium-sized firm trailer. Laboratory and spacecraft were to be launched together; when the payload reached orbit, two crewmen would move from the Gemini into the laboratory for a calendar month's occupancy. Air Forcefulness officials projected a cost of $i.5 billion for 4 flights, the beginning in 1968. fifty
The MOL decision raised immediate questions virtually the NASA-DoD pact on cooperative development of an orbital station. Although some outsiders considered the Pentagon's determination a repudiation of the Webb-McNamara understanding, both NASA and DoD described MOL as a unmarried military project rather than a broad space program. They agreed not to construe it equally the National Space Station, a separate program then under joint written report; and when NASA and DoD established a National Infinite Station Planning Subpanel in March 1964 (every bit an adjunct of the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board), its job was to recommend a station that would follow MOL. Air Strength printing releases implied that McNamara's approval gave primary responsibleness for space stations to the military, while NASA officials insisted that the armed services program complemented its own post-Apollo plans. Withal, concern that the two programs might announced too like prompted engineers at Langley and MSC to rework their designs to look less like MOL. 51
Actually, McNamara'due south annunciation did not constitute program [ xviii ] approval, and for the next 20 months MOL struggled for recognition and adequate funding. Planning went ahead in 1964 and some contracts were allow, simply the deliberate arroyo to MOL reflected political realities. In September Congressman Olin Teague (Dem., Tex.), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Manned Infinite Flying and of the Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, recommended that DoD adapt Apollo to its needs. Shortly after the 1964 ballot, Senate space committee chairman Clinton Anderson (Dem., Due north.Grand.) told the president that he opposed MOL; he believed the government could salvage more a billion dollars in the next five years by canceling the Air Force projection and applying its funds to an Extended Apollo station. Despite rumors of MOL's impending cancellation, the FY 1966 budget proposal included a tentative commitment of $ 150 meg. 52
The Bureau of the Upkeep, reluctant to approve ii programs that seemed likely to overlap, allocated funds to MOL in Dec with the understanding that McNamara would concord the money awaiting farther studies and another review in May. DoD would continue to ascertain military experiments, while NASA identified Apollo configurations that might satisfy military requirements. A joint study would consider MOL's utility for not-military missions. A NASA-DoD news release on 25 Jan 1965 said that overlapping programs must be avoided. For the next few years both agencies would use hardware and facilities "already bachelor or now under active development" for their manned spaceflight programs-at to the lowest degree "to the maximum degree possible." 53
In February a NASA committee undertook a three-month study to determine Apollo's potential as an globe-orbiting laboratory and ascertain key scientific experiments for a mail service-Apollo earth-orbital flying program. Although the group had worked closely with an Air Force team, the committee'south recommendations obviously had little effect on MOL, the basic concept for which was unaltered by the review. More important, the study helped NASA clarify its own post-Apollo plans. 54
Since late 1964, advocates of a military space plan had increased their support for MOL, the Firm Military Operations Subcommittee recommending in June that DoD brainstorm full-scale development without further delay. Two weeks later a member of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics urged a crash programme to launch the beginning MOL within xviii months. Russian and American advances with the Voskhod and Gemini flights-multi-manned missions and space walks-made a military role more plausible. On 25 August 1965, MOL finally received President Johnson's approval. 55 Asked if the Air Force had clearly established a function for homo in space, a Pentagon spokesman indicated that the chances seemed skilful enough to warrant evaluating man'south ability "much more thoroughly than we're able to practice on the ground." NASA could not provide the answers because the Gemini spacecraft was likewise cramped. One [ 19 ] newsman wanted to know why the Air Strength had abandoned Apollo; the answer was that Apollo'south lunar capabilities were in many ways much more than MOL needed. If hindsight suggests that parochial interests were factor, the Air Force nonetheless had adept reasons to shun Apollo. The lunar landing remained America's primary commitment in space. Until the goal was achieved, an Air Force program using would surely accept 2nd place. 56
In early 1964 NASA undertook nevertheless another detailed exam of its plans, this time at the request of the White House. Lyndon Johnson had played an important role in the U.S. infinite program since his days equally the Senate majority leader. Noting that post-Apollo programs were probable to evidence costly and complex, the president requested a statement of futurity space objectives and the research and development programs that supported them. 57
Webb handed the assignment to an advert hoc Future Programs Chore Group. After v months of work, the group fabricated no startling proposals. Their report recognized that Gemini and Apollo were making heavy demands on financial and human resources and urged NASA to concentrate on those programs while deferring "large new mission commitments for further study and analysis." By capitalizing on the "size, versatility, and efficiency" of the Saturn and Apollo, the U.S. should be able to maintain space preeminence well into the 1970s. Early definition of an intermediate set of missions using proven hardware was recommended. Then, a relatively pocket-sized commitment of funds within the side by side twelvemonth would enable NASA to wing worthwhile Extended Apollo missions by 1968. Finally, long-range planning should exist connected for space stations and manned flights to Mars in the 1970s. 58
The written report plain satisfied Webb, who used it extensively in subsequent congressional hearings. It should also have pleased Robert Seamans, since he was anxious to extend the Apollo capability across the lunar landing. Others in and outside of NASA institute fault with the certificate. The Senate space committee described the report as "somewhat obsolete," containing "less data than expected in terms of future planning." Committee members faulted its omission of essential details and recommended a 50% cut in Extended Apollo funding, arguing that enough studies had already been conducted. Elsewhere on Capitol Hill, NASA supporters called for specific recommendations. Inside the space agency, some officials had hoped for a more ambitious declaration, possibly a recommendation for a Mars landing every bit the adjacent manned projection. At Huntsville, a future projects official concluded that the plan [ twenty ] offered no real claiming to NASA (and particularly to Marshall) once Apollo was accomplished. 59
In thinking of futurity missions, NASA officials were aware of how niggling experience had been gained in manned flying. The longest Mercury mission had lasted less than 35 hours. Webb and Seamans insisted before congressional committees that the results of the longer Gemini flights might touch future planning, and a decision on any major new program should, in whatsoever event, be delayed until after the lunar landing. The matter of funding weighed even more than heavily against starting a new program. NASA budgets had reached a plateau at $5.2 billion in financial 1964, an amount but sufficient for Gemini and Apollo. Disallowment an increment in bachelor money, new manned programs would have to look for the downturn in Apollo spending after 1966. In that location was trivial back up in the Johnson administration or Congress to increase NASA's upkeep; indeed, Great Society programs and the Vietnam war were pushing in the opposite direction. The Air Force's space program was another problem, since some members of Congress and the Budget Bureau favored MOL as the state's first space laboratory. 60
Equally compelling reasons favored an early start of Extended Apollo. A follow-on program, even i using Saturn and Apollo hardware, would crave three to 4 years' lead fourth dimension. Unless a new programme started in 1965 or early 1966, the hiatus betwixt the lunar landing program and its successor would adversely bear upon the 400 000-member Apollo team. Already, skilled pattern engineers were nearing the terminate of their tasks. The problem was particularly worrisome to Marshall, for Saturn IB-Apollo flights would end early on in 1968. In the fall of 1964, a Future Projects Group appointed by von Braun began biweekly meetings to consider Marshall'southward hereafter. In Washington, George Mueller pondered ways of keeping the Apollo team intact. By 1968 or 1969, when the U.S. Ianded on the moon, the nation's aerospace establishment would exist able to produce and fly 8 Apollos and 12 Saturns per year; only Mueller faced a vicious paradox: the buildup of the Apollo industrial base of operations left him no money to utilise information technology effectively later the lunar landing. 61
Until mid-1965 Extended Apollo was classified as advanced study planning; that summer Mueller moved it into the 2d phase of project development, project definition. A Saturn-Apollo Applications Program Office was established alongside the Gemini and Apollo offices at NASA Headquarters. Maj. Gen. David Jones, an Air Forcefulness officer on temporary duty with NASA, headed the new office; John H. Disher became deputy managing director, a post he would fill for the adjacent 8 years. 62 Little fanfare attended the opening on 6 August 1965. Apollo and Gemini held the [ 21 ] spotlight, merely establishment of the program office was a significant milestone however. Behind lay 6 years of infinite-station studies and three years of mail-Apollo planning. Ahead loomed several large bug: winning fiscal support from the Johnson administration and Congress, defining new relationships between NASA centers, and coordinating Apollo Applications with Apollo. Mueller had advanced the new program's cause in spite of these uncertainties, confident in the worth of Extended Apollo studies and motivated by the needs of his Apollo team. In the trying years ahead, the Apollo Applications Programme (AAP) would need all the confidence and motivation it could muster.
i All 3 of the Skylab scientist-astronauts were in this first group, selected on 27 June 1965.
ii The instrument unit of measurement was the electronic nerve centre of inflight rocket control and was located between the booster's uppermost stage and the spacecraft.
iii The Saturn IB or "uprated Saturn 1" was a two-phase rocket like its predecessor but with an improved and enlarged 2d stage.
iv In directly flight the vehicle travels from the earth to the moon past the shortest road, brakes, and lands; it returns the same fashion. This requires taking off with all the stages and fuel needed for the round trip, dictating a very large booster. In lunar-orbit rendezvous two spacecraft are sent to the moon: a landing vehicle and an earth-return vehicle. While the quondam lands, the latter stays in orbit awaiting the lander's return; when they accept rejoined, the lander is discarded and the crew comes home in the return ship. Von Braun and his group adopted earth-orbit rendezvous as doctrine.
v Molecular sieves contain a highly absorbent mineral usually a zeolite (a potassium aluminosilicate), whose construction is a three-dimensional lattice with regularly spaced channels of molecular dimensions; the channels comprise up to half the book of the material. Molecules (such every bit carbon dioxide) small enough to enter these channels are captivated, and can later be driven off by heating regenerating the zeolite for further use.
vi Mariner 2 was launched toward Venus on 27 Baronial 1962; in Oct came ii Explorer launches and the Mercury flight of Walter 1000. Schirra, on sixteen November NASA conducted its tertiary successful Saturn I exam flight.
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